SSJP

SOMALIA SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME

Evidence from FCAS Security and Justice Interventions

April 2021

1. Introduction

The purpose of this section of the literature review is to review evidence from security and justice (S&J) interventions in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS).[1] It reviews the strength of evidence for different thematic areas of S&J intervention and, for each area, examines what the literature says works and does not work. In particular, it tries to answer the following overall SSJP design phase research question: how can S&J build the social contract and social covenant to build longer-term peace and stability?

The paper comprises a brief methodological section explaining the limitations of the literature review, before examining the available evidence related to seven distinct S&J programming approaches (capacity building, community-driven approaches, gender-specific approaches, accountability, engaging non-state actors, policy, and legal aid interventions). A final section examines gaps in the evidence base and considers the implications for future S&J programming in Somalia.

2. Methodology

The literature review draws on the findings of an HMG-commissioned evidence mapping conducted by the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) in 2015 and updated in 2019, which provides a database of 502 S&J related studies.[2] The GSDRC mapping captures global evidence on S&J and is not restricted to FCAS, and while it describes what the strength of evidence is for particular types of interventions and thematic areas of programming, it does not describe what the evidence actually says. This literature review therefore builds on the GSDRC mapping exercise by focusing on studies in the database relating to FCAS and examining what evidence they provide for effective and less effective approaches to S&J programming. A similar exercise was carried out by DFID in 2015, which examined global (rather than FCAS) evidence from the GSDCR database relating to capacity building S&J interventions.[3]

S&J studies examined in this paper are drawn from the interactive GSDRC SSR database. Search results were filtered to include only studies related to FCAS, which reduced the number of studies from 502 to 204. Because of time limitations, the search was further restricted to only include studies that were either programme evaluations, or peer-reviewed academic articles using an experimental research design. This approach has the advantage of filtering out lower-quality evidence, and ensuring that the studies reviewed are generally of medium-to high-quality. However, it does so at the expense of breadth; the extensive 'grey literature', including think-tank reports and purely conceptual or theoretical papers, likely contains valuable lessons for S&J interventions, but it is more difficult to assess the 'evidence' they

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[1] The World Bank, *Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCAS),* (2020).

[2] Paul Jackson, Joe Bell, Shivit Bakrania, *Security and justice evidence mapping update: Rapid literature review, June 2019.* (Birmingham: GSDRC, 2019).

[3] Lisa Denney, Craig Valters, *Evidence synthesis: Security sector reform and organisational capacity building,* Rapid Evidence Assessment, November 2015 (London: Department for International Development, 2015).

provide for what works. After some search items were removed for duplication, this yielded a total of 17 studies.[4]

The 17 search results were then evaluated both in terms of the strength of evidence they provide, using guidelines provided by DFID in 2014,[5] and in terms of what that evidence suggests works and does not work in S&J programming. The studies were examined according to seven thematic categories of intervention: capacity building, community-driven, gender specific, accountability, engagement of non-state/non-statutory actors, policy and frameworks, and legal aid.[6] Categories related to defence or intelligence reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) were also not included as they were deemed beyond the scope of SSJP. Most studies covered more than one category (see Table 1 below).

As noted in the other individual papers that comprise this literature review, efforts to assess and grade the strength of evidence always involve a degree of subjectivity, even with the guidance provided by DFID. The grading system also includes a degree of built-in bias in favour of studies that provide a clearly articulated methodology, regardless of the quality of their analysis and findings.

Table 1 – Summary of evidence of S&J interventions

Category of intervention	Strength of evidence	Assessment of evidence strength	Examples from
Capacity building	Medium	Ten studies found, of which five are assessed as being of high quality, comprising three programme evaluations (Cox et al 2012; Bennet et al 2010; Labda 2011) and two experimental studies in peer-reviewed articles (Blair et al 2015; Karim et al 2016). Three other evaluations are assessed as providing medium quality evidence (Huber & Musleh, 2016; Lombardini & Vigneri 2015; Roseveare et al 2015). The methodologies for these studies reported limitations relating to the availability of data, access and timeframe, which limited the ability of evaluators to attribute findings to the interventions being measured. Two studies are assessed as providing low-quality evidence (Low, 2015; IDLO, 2019) as	Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, OPTs, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Timor Leste.

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[4] Some search items were removed because of duplication, or because after being reviewed they were found to refer to FCAS only in passing.

[5] DFID, *How to Note: Assessing the Strength of Evidence,* (London: Department for International Development, 2014).

[6] A separate strand of the literature review focuses in detail on evidence from gender-focused S&J interventions.

		they provided only limited details of their methodologies.	
Community-driven	Limited	Five studies found, including one programme evaluation assessed as providing high-quality evidence (Dinnen & Hayley, 2012). Two other evaluations were graded as medium-quality evidence (Koleros & Stein, 2015; Huber & Musleh, 2016). The former used a quasi-experimental approach nested within an overarching theory-based evaluation design, with quantitative data collected through two cross-sectional representative household sample surveys. However, some key information on sampling methodology was not provided. Two programme evaluations were graded as providing low-quality evidence (IDLO, 2019; Low, 2015), as key information about their methodologies was not provided.	Afghanistan, DRC, Mali, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste
Gender-specific	Limited	Five studies found, including two using an experimental research design graded as high-quality evidence (Karim et al, 2018; Karim et al, 2016). Three programme evaluations were assessed as providing medium-quality evidence (Koleros & Stein, 2015; Lombardini & Vigneri, 2015; Roseveare et al 2015).	Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Liberia, OPTs, Timor Leste
Accountability	Limited	Two studies found; one programme evaluation assessed as providing medium-quality evidence (Russel-Einhorn & Tun, 2017), and one evaluation assessed as providing low-quality evidence (Low, 2015).	Afghanistan, DRC, Myanmar, OPTs, Timor Leste
Engaging non-state/non-statutory actors	Limited	Three studies found, including one graded as high-quality (Dinnen & Hayley, 2012); one as medium-quality (Huber & Musleh, 2016) and one as low-quality evidence (IDLO, 2019).	Afghanistan, Mali, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste
Policy	Limited	Three programme evaluation found, graded as providing high-quality (Labda 2011) and medium-quality evidence (Huber & Musleh, 2016; Koleros & Stein 2015).	Afghanistan, DRC.
Legal aid	Limited	Four studies found, including two assessed as providing high-quality evidence (Slough & Fariss, 2017; Sandefur & Siddiqi, 2013) and two providing medium-quality evidence (Russel-Einhorn & Tun, 2017; Lombardini & Vigneri, 2015).	Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, Lebanon, Myanmar

3. Assessment of evidence from interventions

Overview of the evidence

The GSDRC database yielded just 17 studies focused on FCAS that were either programme evaluations or peer-reviewed articles using an experimental research design. Ten of these studies were assessed as providing high-quality evidence, five as medium-quality, and two as low-quality. The studies assess donor interventions in FCAS environments in sub-Saharan Africa (South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Mali), the Middle East and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), the Asia-Pacific (Myanmar, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste), and Latin America (Haiti). They primarily have a single-country rather than comparative focus, with the exception of an evaluation of an Oxfam intervention in Lebanon that is part of a wider review of a programme in the Middle East region. The studies primarily use an observational research design, relying on qualitative methods (key informant interviews, focus group discussions, field visit observations) and secondary literature reviews; four studies use an experimental research design.

The largest body of FCAS evidence included in the database (10 studies) relates to capacity-building interventions. Five studies each were identified for community-driven and gender-specific interventions; in many cases these overlap with capacity-building interventions although some gender-specific interventions focus on changing social attitudes and norms. Four studies relate to the provision of legal aid, while three studies each refer to engaging non-state/non-statutory S&J actors and policy framework interventions. Only two studies were found relating to accountability interventions.

Capacity building interventions

The 10 studies focusing on capacity building interventions encompass a variety of different activities centred on training, equipment provision, and institution building for both police and justice actors. Overall, while a number of examples of promising approaches are identified by the literature, these are primarily at either an individual or short-term level, rather than a systemic or longer-term level. In reference to the Solomon Islands, Cox et al (2012) conclude that "at best, and under optimal circumstances, strengthened capacity is necessary but not sufficient for improving the provision of law and justice".[7]

Key findings from the literature include:

1. *Capacity building interventions can work in terms of increasing the knowledge, skills, awareness, and technical capacity of S&J workers.*

   Several studies provide evidence that training can lead to increased capacity of S&J providers. For example, a mid-term evaluation of an IDLO programme to strengthen the criminal justice chain in Mali found that trainings had "contributed, to an extent, to improved

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[7] Marcus Cox, Emele Duituturaga, Eric Scheye, *Solomon Islands case study: Evaluation of Australian law and justice assistance* (Canberra: Australian Agency for International Development, 2012).

performance in criminal justice institutions", with some evidence to suggest a reduction in the average time required for a first court hearing and for an investigation to be completed.[8]

The literature also suggests positive results from capacity building efforts combined with a focus on either gender or community-based approaches. For example, a mid-term review of Australia's Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) programme in Afghanistan found that work with the police had shown a "clear demonstration of progress, with considerable training activities undertaken and the adoption of awareness raising of police on standard operating procedures for response to GBV cases", with improved access to justice demonstrated by case files being properly registered by the police and referred.[9]

An impact evaluation of an Oxfam programme to improve access to justice for women in Lebanon found evidence that training and awareness sessions had changed attitudes among legal practitioners and court officials "who appear to be more inclined to support women in accessing pathways to justice", while noting the limited nature of the data.[10] Similarly, Karim et al used an experimental research design to examine the results of UN efforts to rebuild the Liberian National Police, and found that most police officers had knowledge of statutory crimes and evidence gathering, almost half were aware of gendered crimes, and that male and female officers were equally competent.[11] Finally, An independent evaluation of DFID's Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPR) in DRC found that police officers had "positively changed their practice as a result of SSAPR intervention", with community members reporting improvements in police practice. It also found "credible evidence" that training local politico-administrative officials had led to improved capacity and changes in their practices regarding local security concerns.[12]

2. *A lack of strategic vision can limit the impact of capacity building interventions, while improved capacity does not necessarily lead to better provision of S&J services for citizens.*

A multi-donor evaluation of programming in South Sudan described capacity building work as "piecemeal and often un-strategic", noting the lack of an integrated approach to the

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[8] IDLO, *Mid-term evaluation of the IDLO-implemented project "strengthening the criminal justice chain in the north of Mali (SCJC)",* (IDLO: 2019).

[9] Marie Huber, Nabila Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan* (AusAid/DFAT, 2016).

[10] Simone Lombardini, Marcella Vigneri, *Women's Empowerment in Lebanon: Impact evaluation of the project 'Women's access to justice in the Middle East and North Africa region'* (Oxfam, 2015).

[11] Sabrina Karim, Ryan Gorman, 'Building a more competent security sector: The case of UNMIL and the Liberian National Police', *International Peacekeeping,* 23.1, 158-191.

[12] Andrew Koleros and Danielle Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report*, (London: DFID, 2015).

security and justice sectors and too much focus on implementing Western 'best practice'.[13] Similarly, an evaluation of Australia's contribution to law and justice assistance in the Solomon Islands highlighted the lack of strategic vision for "what kind of law and justice interventions were to be developed, even though it is axiomatic that development and/or institution building cannot truly take hold without clear and definitive objectives".[14] It also noted that capacity building interventions may not necessarily lead to better outcomes for citizens at the local level, as "the beneficiaries of a capacity-building model are the institutions of law and justice".[15]

3. *The benefits of capacity building tend to be short-term, with limited evidence of longer-term impact.*

The literature also suggests that the benefits of capacity building interventions are more likely to be felt in the short-term than over the longer-term. An evaluation of Australian assistance in the Solomon Islands found that S&J programming had played a significant role in initial post-conflict stabilisation efforts and in re-establishing basic law and justice institutions, but that the model had not been effective in transitioning to the subsequent development context in providing security and justice services to the population (Cox et al 2012).[16] Evaluations from the DRC also note the short-term impact of capacity building work.[17] However, an evaluation of DFID's SSAPR programme found that some of these achievements were short-lived; for example, an improvement in police practice that resulted from programme training was subsequently reversed because of declining motivation among officers.[18]

Similarly, the results of capacity building may be noticeable at an individual level, but do not necessarily translate into systemic change. For example, the evaluation of Oxfam's access to justice programme in Lebanon suggested that training and awareness-raising had changed attitudes among some individual judges and lawyers, but that it was "not systemic" and that observations in the field "revealed a discrepancy between knowledge and behavior [sic]".[19]

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[13] Jon Bennett, Sara Pantuliano, Wendy Fenton, Anthony Vaux, Chris Barnett, and Emery Brusset, *Aiding the Peace - A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005 – 2010,* (London: ITAD, 2010).

[14] Cox et al. *Solomon Islands case study.*

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Cox et al. *Solomon Islands case study.*

[17] Channel Research, *Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in DRC*, (Ohain: Channel Research, 2011).

[18] Koleros and Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[19] Lombardini & Vigneri, *Women's Empowerment in Lebanon.*

4. Capacity building interventions often have limited sustainability because national governments may lack the required financial resources or the political will to make needed reforms.

The limited long-term and transformational impact of capacity building interventions is further hampered by limited resources and incentives on the part of national governments. In the Solomon Islands, Cox et al noted that the authorities appeared to show little commitment and even active resistance to longer-term SSR, knowing that international donors would continue to provide financial assistance.[20] In the DRC, Koleros and Stein highlighted the lack of political engagement of the national authorities as the "biggest risk" to long-term sustainability,[21] while Channel Research also noted the "very limited" sustainability of capacity building, in part because of the limited commitment of international donors.[22]

5. Capacity building is necessary but not sufficient for improved security and justice

The literature highlights examples where achieving results in other areas thematic areas can be contingent on first developing the capacity of security and justice actors, either through training or equipment and infrastructure provision.[23] However, as Cox et al conclude, "at best, and under optimal circumstances, strengthened capacity is necessary but not sufficient for improving the provision of law and justice".[24]

Community-driven interventions

The literature review identified five studies providing a mixture of high-, medium-, and low-quality evidence on community-driven approaches to S&J programming. Overall, the evidence for the effectiveness of community-driven approaches is mixed, suggesting some areas where it has shown promise (for example, in improving community perceptions of S&J actors), but limited evidence of actual improved delivery or sustainability. Key findings include:

1. Community-driven approaches can improve perceptions of S&J, but this is not necessarily linked to improved S&J outcomes.

The literature suggests there is sometimes a discrepancy between perceptions of security and justice provision and actual levels of safety and security as measured, for example, by crime incidence rates. This finding has implications for how S&J interventions should look to measure success, and whether perceptions of security and justice should be used as a

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[20] Cox et al. *Solomon Islands case study*

[21] Koleros and Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[22] Channel Research, *Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in DRC*

[23] IDLO, *Mid-term evaluation;* Cox et al.,

[24] Cox et al., *Solomon Islands case study*

proxy for measuring either overall levels of security or the quality of services delivered by S&J providers.

A DFID-funded SSAPR programme in the DRC contributed to improved community perceptions of police performance and perceptions of overall safety, despite more mixed results in terms of actual safety and security, with incidence of crime in both programme sites and comparison sites increasing during the intervention.[25] Similarly, an evaluation of a community officer project in the Solomon Islands found evidence that the intervention had led to community perceptions of improved safety, related to the deterrent effect provided by the community officers, but was unable to determine whether or not the approach had contributed to improved security.[26]

2. *There is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of bottom-up initiatives improving coordination within the S&J sector.*

A number of interventions have developed or supported informal, community-level platforms to improve coordination between S&J actors, and therefore improve the provision of S&J services. by A mid-term evaluation of an IDLO intervention that supported community-level consultation and coordination groups (CCGs) in Mali as informal platforms to discuss challenges and coordinate local solutions, found that the approach had been "effective in improving coordination between criminal justice chain actors and, to some extent, fostering synergies with civil society, local and traditional authorities".[27] An evaluation of a DFID programme in DRC found that community engagement activities organised by local CSOs and the media encouraged greater cooperation between citizens and the police.[28] Similarly, an evaluation of the Australian-funded EVAW programme in Afghanistan demonstrated that the intervention had been effective in improving coordination between civil society organisations working on women's issues, by providing a platform for them to meet and coordinate.[29]

However, one study suggests that limited engagement from formal or statutory S&J actors will limit the effectiveness of community-driven initiatives. An initiative in the Solomon Islands to support community officers independent from the official police did not meet expectations about improved responsiveness by S&J providers or the creation of close working relationships between the community officers and the police. The evaluation suggests this

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[25] Koleros and Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[26] Sinclair Dinnen and Nicole Haley, *Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in Solomon Islands,* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2012).

[27] IDLO, *Mid-term evaluation of the IDLO-implemented project "strengthening the criminal justice chain in the north of Mali.*

[28] Koleros and Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[29] Huber and Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*

was the result of limited capacity on the part of the police to provide adequate levels of support.[30]

Gender-specific interventions

Five studies of generally medium- to high-quality provide evidence of gender-specific approaches to capacity building, the provision of legal aid, or the provision of specialist services to victims of violence against women and girls (VAWG). As with community-driven approaches, most of the gender-specific interventions described in the literature refer to capacity building approaches, although some also look to change attitudes and norms at both an individual and societal level. Key findings include:

1. *A gendered-approach to capacity building can improve the ability of S&J actors to respond to incidents of VAWG.*

   The literature cites a number of examples where capacity building work has contributed to an improvement in the ability of S&J actors to understand and respond to gender-based violence (GBV) and VAWG. However, many of these examples refer to positive changes at an individual level or are unable to demonstrate impact at a systemic level or over a longer time period.

   Koleros and Stein find evidence that a gender-specific dimension to capacity building, including the provision of training, infrastructure and equipment to support police deal with female victims of GBV contributed to improvements in police performance and community perceptions of safety in DRC.[31] Similarly, Huber and Musleh note that training for the police on the adoption and awareness of standard operating procedures for responding to GBV cases contributed to increased access for justice for women in Afghanistan.[32] A DFID-funded programme to support more accountable security and justice provision in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) provided basic equipment to support the establishment of family protection units (FPUs) in police stations, which provided specialist police services for victims of VAWG. A programme evaluation noted an increase in the number of women and girls reporting cases of VAWG and evidence of increased public confidence in the formal justice system, and concluded that the programme had contributed to efforts to enhance women's access to justice, while noting the difficulty in gauging the scale of that contribution.[33] Two laboratory-style experiments assessing donor efforts to build the capacity of the Liberian police found that almost half of police officers were aware

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[30] Dinnen and Haley, *Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in Solomon Islands.*

[31] Koleros and Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[32] Huber and Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*

[33] Caroline Roseveare, Catherine Müeller and Samar Baidoun, Support to accountable security & justice in the OPT: Evaluation Report (Social Development Direct, 2014).

of gendered crimes and that male and female officers were equally competent,[34] and that increasing the number of women police officers increased unit cohesion.[35] In Afghanistan, the provision of specialist services through NGO-run Women's Protection Centres and Family Guidance Centres was found to have made an effective contribution to increasing women's access to better services.[36]

2. *Gender-specific interventions can help to change attitudes, but primarily at an individual rather than systemic level.*

Two studies provide some evidence of gender-specific interventions contributing to a positive change in attitudes towards issues related to VAWG. However, there is limited evidence of the ability of these interventions to influence attitudes beyond immediate beneficiaries or at a systemic or societal level. Similarly, the literature provides little evidence for the ability of such interventions to improve S&J provision as a whole.

Huber and Musleh find some limited evidence that the Australian-funded EVAW programme in Afghanistan increased community awareness of VAWG which contributed to "supporting the transformation of social norms in support of more positive gender role attitudes that contribute to the reduction of VAW[G]".[37] An impact evaluation of an Oxfam intervention to improve access to justice for women in Lebanon found the programme had had significant impact at the individual level. Training and awareness campaigns contributed to a shift in attitudes and beliefs among women who participated in the campaign, although achieving change at an institutional or societal level proved more difficult.[38] Karim et al found that simply increasing the number of women officers did not have an influence on male beliefs about women's role in policing, or on individual or group sensitivity to sexual and gender-based violence.[39]

Policy and framework interventions

Three studies from Afghanistan and DRC of either high- or medium-quality evidence examine interventions that look to support the development of government policies and frameworks related to S&J. Key finding:

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[34] Karim and Gorman, 'Building a more competent security sector'.

[35] Sabrina Karim, Michael J Gilligan, Robert Blair and Kyle Beardsley, 'International Gender Balancing Reforms in Postconflict Countries: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from the Liberian National Police', *International Studies Quarterly,* 62.3, 618-631.

[36] Huber and Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Lombardini & Vigneri, *Women's Empowerment in Lebanon.*

[39] Karim and Gorman, 'Building a more competent security sector'.

1. *The success of policy and framework interventions can be limited in the absence of host government capacity and buy-in.*

   The three studies find limited evidence of success, noting that progress can be impeded by limited engagement or capacity on the part of national governments. Huber and Musleh find that the policy engagement component of the EVAW programme in Afghanistan was less successful than other strands, noting only a few examples of effective policy engagement (e.g., the introduction of standard operating procedures for combatting VAWG by the ministry of interior and the introduction of a new curriculum by the police academy).[40] In DRC, Channel Research noted that the national authorities had limited involvement in justice programming because of limited vision and policy.[41] Similarly, Koleros and Stein suggested that despite some success in establishing a legal framework for police reform through new laws and decrees, a lack of political engagement by the authorities was a major risk to long-term sustainability.[42]

Accountability interventions

The literature review identified only two studies (one assessed as medium-quality and the other as low-quality) that address accountability interventions, both of which focus on bottom-up approaches. Key finding:

1. *There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of accountability interventions in supporting S&J reform.*

   An evaluation of an Irish Aid programme supporting access to justice in Timor Leste found that supporting civil society organisations to provide accountability had enabled cases of corruption to be taken up by the relevant state agency (the Provedor's Office).[43] A midterm evaluation of a USAID programme to promote the rule of law in Myanmar refers to support to journalist groups to report on government accountability and transparency and to other CSOs to provide advocacy. However, it provided no evidence of its success or otherwise.[44]

Interventions that engage with non-state actors

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[40] Huber & Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*

[41] Channel Research, *Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in DRC*

[42] Koleros & Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[43] Sally Low, *Evaluation of the "Providing Access to Justice – Legal Awareness at the Grassroots Level" Project- Timor Leste*, (Brussels: Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015).

[44] Malcolm Russell-Einhorn and Aung Tun, *Mid-term performance evaluation of USAID/Burma Promoting Rule of Law Project,* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2017).

Three studies assessed as providing high-, medium- and low-quality address the issue of support to non-state S&J actors. Key finding:

1. There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of interventions that engage with non-state actors, despite some encouraging results.

As noted in the section on community-driven approaches, Dinnen and Hayley find that a programme to support a community officer (CO) pilot in the Solomon Islands – whereby civilian volunteers operated without special legal powers to resolve minor disputes and refer serious cases to the police – contributed to improved community perceptions of safety.[45] However, the evaluation noted a possible divergence between perceptions and the actual provision of S&J, concluding that was "simply no reliable data to establish categorically whether or not COs are contributing to improved security in the communities in which they operate". In Afghanistan, Huber and Musleh noted some progress made in increasing access to justice for women through the informal justice sector, particularly through combatting violence against women through religious perspectives.[46] Some limited evidence suggested that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms had become more supportive of women in VAWG cases, although the authors note the need for more data in an endline evaluation. An IDLO intervention in Mali that supported Consultation and Coordination Groups (CCGs) – informal, community-driven platforms to improve coordination among S&J actors – suggested that CCGs had the potential to facilitate the coordination of parallel legal systems (i.e. customary law), but provided no evidence to demonstrate that this had already occurred.[47]

Legal aid interventions

Four studies of high- and medium-quality evidence examine the effectiveness of legal aid interventions. Three of these studies examine the way in which legal aid can improve access to justice, while a fourth suggests that paralegals can act as "agents of change" in changing

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[45] Dinnen & Hayley, *Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in Solomon Islands.*

[46] Huber & Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*

[47] IDLO, *Mid-term evaluation of the IDLO-implemented project "strengthening the criminal justice chain in the north of Mali.*

attitudes in the community, although provides limited evidence to support the claim.[48] Key finding:

1. *The provision of legal aid can improve access to justice, especially to socially-disadvantaged members of society.*

Sandefur and Siddiqi conducted a randomised trial of an intervention in Liberia that provided legal aid as a means of addressing the disadvantages faced by people in terms of access to justice.[49] The poor and socially disadvantaged face a trade-off between customary legal institutions that can be repressive and discriminatory, and formal legal institutions that have high costs and a punitive approach to justice. The study showed that plaintiffs who were offered legal aid were "significantly more satisfied with case outcomes, pay fewer bribes, and report large material gains in terms of household and child-food security". The study found the demand for and impacts of the programme were greater amongst individuals who were disadvantaged by the customary system, leading the authors to conclude that "there are large socioeconomic gains to be had from improving access to the formal law". Similarly, in an evaluation of the USAID 'Projustice' programme in Haiti, Slough and Fariss use a randomised control trial and find that legal assistance "does assist in reducing the duration that cases remain in illegal pretrial detention", but only if reductions in the duration of pretrial detention counterbalance the number of individuals being detained.[50]

A midterm evaluation of a USAID-funded rule of law intervention in Myanmar, which provided grants to local legal aid centres, also found promising results of legal aid assistance. While noting the challenge in assessing the overall effectiveness of the approach given the limited timeframe of programming, the evaluation found "some evidence that the justice centers [sic] obtain better outcomes than in the criminal justice system at large", and that programme grants were "vital" in improving outreach, counselling, representation and some case outcomes.[51]

Gaps in the evidence base

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[48] Lombardini & Vigneri, *Women's Empowerment in Lebanon.*

[49] Justin Sandefur and Bilal Siddiqi, *Delivering justice to the poor: Theory and experimental evidence from Liberia. Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop on African Political Economy,* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2013).

[50] Tara Slough and Christopher Fariss, *DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity, Impact Evaluation of USAID Haiti PROJUSTICE Program Pretrial Detention Component,* (USAID, 2017).

[51] Russell-Einhorn & Tun, *Mid-term performance evaluation of USAID/Burma Promoting Rule of Law Project.*

As is clear from the key findings summarised above, the literature focuses primarily on the effectiveness or otherwise of interventions at an output level – i.e., relatively tangible results that can be attributed with a reasonable degree of confidence to the intervention itself. By contrast, there is very little focus on impact level results, i.e., longer-term, indirect, and less tangible results. As a result, there is little or no evidence that answers the overall research question for the SSJP design process: how can S&J build the social contract and social covenant to build longer-term peace and stability.

In terms of thematic programming areas, capacity-building interventions predominated in the studies reviewed by this paper (10 studies), followed by community-driven and gender-specific interventions (five studies each). To some extent, this finding is in keeping with the results of the 2019 GSDRC evidence mapping, which concluded that there is abundant scope for capacity building of organisations, strategic/statutory frameworks, community-based approaches, and re-structuring of the S&J sector.[52] Because of the more limited inclusion criteria of this literature review, very few or no studies were identified relating to strategic/statutory frameworks or re-structuring of the S&J sector in FCAS. Meanwhile, the GSDRC mapping concluded the evidence was limited for preventative interventions (i.e., integrated efforts to prevent violence and crime), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), integrated political engagement to promote political will, and displaced/refugee interventions.

1. Implications for future S&J programming and research in Somalia

FCAS comprises a range of diverse country contexts, and what has proved effective in one location may not do so elsewhere. However, a number of findings from this paper correspond with those from the previous section in the literature review (*Evidence from S&J interventions in Somalia*). The possible implications of those findings for future S&J programming in Somalia might usefully, therefore, be the object of further research.

First, this paper adds weight to a broader finding from the global literature on S&J programming that measuring success at an impact level is difficult, and evidence is therefore limited. Although the literature reviewed for the paper included a number of impact evaluations, very little reference was in fact made to the longer-term impact of programming; instead, studies focused primarily on effect at an output and outcome level. An obvious yet essential conclusion is simply that all S&J interventions should prioritise effective research, monitoring, evaluation and learning as a foundational component of programming.

Second, the studies reviewed reinforce the finding that capacity building programming – while in many cases essential – is on its own insufficient to support effective reform of the S&J sector. Evidence from the DRC, Lebanon, Sudan and the Solomon Islands suggests that the benefits of capacity building are likely to be short term and primarily at the level of the individual (rather than at an institutional or societal level), that capacity building should be part of a broader strategic approach to have greater impact, and that interventions are likely to have limited capacity in the absence of host government resources or buy-in. Studies from Afghanistan, DRC and the OPTs provide some promising results of a specific gender-focused

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[52] Jackson et al, *Security and justice evidence mapping*

approach to capacity building. However, again, the success of these interventions appears to be primarily over the short rather than the long term.

Third, studies from Afghanistan, DRC, Mali and the Solomon Islands suggested some encouraging results from community-driven approaches to programming, but there was limited evidence they had delivered better security and justice outcomes for citizens. Community policing programme in the DRC highlighted the fact that there is sometimes a discrepancy between people's perceptions of S&J provision and *actual* levels of safety and security. Similarly, an intervention in the Solomon Islands noted an improvement in public perceptions of safety, but no indication that overall safety and security had improved. As the DRC study noted, this raises the question of whether programmes that measure perceptions are in fact measuring the most appropriate indicators. Similar questions about the value – and, indeed, accuracy – of measuring perceptions was noted in the Somalia S&J paper.[53]

Fourth, this paper found evidence of gender-specific S&J interventions helping to change attitudes towards issues relating to VAWG at an individual level, but limited evidence of how programming can contribute to changes in norms at a societal level. One study from Afghanistan found success of "supporting the transformation of social norms in support of more positive gender role attitudes", but did not provide sufficient evidence of how it had reached this conclusion.[54] As noted in the GESI sections of the literature review (papers six and seven), these interventions may provide encouraging results for future programming, but further research is needed to strengthen the evidence base for what works.

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[53] Koleros & Stein, *Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme*

[54] Huber and Musleh, *Midterm Review of the DFAT Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) Program in Afghanistan.*